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 This paper argues that the effect of dense social ties, or 
network closure, on a knowledge worker’s performance 
depends on the predominant role this worker plays with 
his or her exchange partners in the relationships affected 
by that closure. Using data on informal exchanges among 
investment bankers in the equities division of a large 
ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rm operating in Europe, Asia-Paciﬁ c, 
Africa, and the Americas in 2001, we ﬁ nd that network 
closure in relationships in which the banker acts as an 
acquirer of information increases his or her performance, 
whereas closure in relationships in which the banker acts 
as a provider of information decreases it. We also ﬁ nd 
that these effects are moderated by the bankers’ ability 
to employ alternative means (such as formal authority) 
to induce the cooperation of exchange partners in their 
acquirer role, as well as by the extent to which the bank-
ers can beneﬁ t from being free from the control of exchange 
partners in their provider role. Our ﬁ ndings highlight the 
two sides of the normative control associated with net-
work closure: control beneﬁ ts people when they need to 
induce exchange partners to behave according to their 
preferences, but it hurts them when it forces them to 
behave according to the preferences of those partners. • 
 Informal networks play an essential role in the performance of 
knowledge workers. These workers create value by acquiring, 
processing, and providing information to create solutions and 
address complex problems. In doing their job, knowledge 
workers acquire information from colleagues and provide 
information to these or to other colleagues throughout the 
organization. The ﬂ ows that result from these multiple 
exchanges aggregate into networks that often cut across 
functional, hierarchical, and geographical boundaries. 
 The position knowledge workers occupy in these informal 
networks can have important consequences for their ability 
to acquire information from (and provide information to) col-
leagues, which in turn should have an effect on their perfor-
mance. Scholars have demonstrated that network position 
can affect outcomes such as promotions (Burt, 1992, 1997; 
Podolny and Baron, 1997), bonuses (Burt, 1997), the ability 
to close deals in commercial banking (Mizruchi and Stearns, 
2001), the number of billable hours by partners in a law ﬁ rm 
(Lazega, 2001), and various performance ratings provided by 
supervisors (e.g., Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001; Sparrowe 
et al., 2001; Cross and Cummings, 2004; Rodan and Galunic, 
2004). In-depth case studies add richness to these ﬁ ndings, 
highlighting two main factors that drive the performance of 
knowledge workers: timely access to high-quality information 
and sufﬁ cient autonomy to produce novel solutions and 
insights (Drucker, 1999; Quinn, 2005; Davenport, 2005). 
 The attempts to link network structures to performance have 
been greatly inﬂ uenced by Burt’s (1992) theory of structural 
holes. In this framework, performance is a function of the 
“brokerage” opportunities created by having access to 
non-redundant information and of the actor’s capacity to main-
tain control of how that information is used. In structural holes 
theory, both of these performance-enhancing aspects are 
fostered by a sparse network structure with few connections 
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between people. Yet this link between sparse networks and 
superior performance has been questioned by scholars who 
stress the importance of cooperation to achieve superior 
outcomes. These scholars do not deny the beneﬁ ts of access-
ing diverse pools of knowledge and of being free to use that 
knowledge in the way the actor sees ﬁ t. They note, however, 
that access may be impaired if it requires the active coopera-
tion of the source and such cooperation is not forthcoming. 
Because the presence of common third parties is likely to 
facilitate the emergence of trust between actors and to create 
incentives to cooperate out of concerns for one’s reputation 
and group sanctions (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988), 
actors should be better off if their networks have “closure”—
that is, if their contacts are connected to one another in a 
dense network. Acknowledging this possibility, Burt (2000, 
2005) has reformulated the theory, indicating that network 
closure may be a precondition to realizing the beneﬁ ts of 
brokerage in settings in which cooperation cannot be taken 
for granted due to a lack of trust between the parties. 
 If network closure only facilitated the removal of barriers to 
cooperation between willful actors who do not have sufﬁ cient 
trust in each other, the sole cost of closure would be the 
increase in information redundancy that structural holes 
theory associates with closely knit networks (Burt, 1992). But 
the effects of network closure go beyond removing barriers 
to cooperation. The reputation and norm enforcement mecha-
nisms associated with network closure create a safer environ-
ment for exchanges not only because they promote trust but 
also because they facilitate the enforcement of cooperative 
norms on the actors (Coleman, 1990: 269). By increasing the 
cost of defection, network closure can compel people to 
behave cooperatively, even when they would have preferred 
to do otherwise. Barker (1993) provided rich ﬁ eld examples 
of the effectiveness of network closure in his ﬁ eld study of 
concerted control in self-managed teams. In a similar vein, 
Lazega (2001: 138–142) found a signiﬁ cant positive effect of 
network closure on the number of hours worked by partners 
in a law ﬁ rm. 
 An important but less explored consequence of the control-
ling properties of network closure on individual performance 
is that they may vary with the role a focal actor plays toward 
his or her contacts. Podolny and Baron (1997) advanced such 
a perspective, showing how the effects of network closure 
on career progression depend on the speciﬁ c relationships 
affected by such closure. Stressing the beneﬁ ts of dense 
networks, they focused on how network closure can convey 
social identity and clear normative expectations associated 
with an actor’s role. But although clear expectations—and the 
enforcement of such expectations—may make it easier for 
actors to perform their roles, they may also reduce actors’ 
autonomy in performing that role. Whether the enhanced 
control of network closure is ultimately a beneﬁ t or a cost for 
a focal actor depends on whose autonomy is most limited by 
that control—that of the actor or that of the exchange part-
ners. Actors should beneﬁ t from network closure in role 
relationships in which they need others to behave according 
to their expectations. Conversely, network closure should 
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hinder an actor when it affects role relationships in which he 
or she would be better off by maintaining autonomy to decide 
how to deal with the expectations of others. 
 The information and knowledge transfer exchanges between 
workers in knowledge-intensive ﬁ rms provide a good example 
of the different roles actors can play with their contacts and 
of how the structure of the network may affect the conditions 
in which they have to perform these roles. A party to a dyadic 
knowledge exchange relationship may act as an acquirer or as 
a provider of knowledge. As an acquirer, the actor needs to 
obtain information from a contact. As a provider, the actor is 
expected to provide information to a contact. The heteroge-
neous distribution of knowledge within the ﬁ rm (Wegner, 
1987; Anand, Manz, and Glick, 1998) can lead to reciprocal 
exchanges in which the acquirer and the provider shift roles 
within the dyad. But heterogeneity may also lead to non-
reciprocal or asymmetric exchanges, which may result also 
in asymmetric interdependence: the actor needs the contact 
more than the contact needs the actor. Insofar as actors 
engage in asymmetric information exchanges, they would 
play predominantly an acquirer role in some relationships and 
a provider role in other relationships. Because transferring 
knowledge is beneﬁ cial for the acquirer but may be costly for 
the provider (Reagans and McEvily, 2003), the cooperation 
of the provider cannot be taken for granted in asymmetric 
exchanges. Here is where the control effects of network 
closure become consequential. 
 Organizations resort to various mechanisms to induce the 
provider’s cooperation with the acquirer in asymmetric 
exchanges, including establishing reporting lines, evaluations, 
and rewards for cooperative behavior. The structure of the 
exchange network may also affect the behaviors of the 
parties to the exchange. Insofar as network closure facilitates 
the emergence and enforcement of cooperative norms, it 
should be beneﬁ cial for the acquirer, especially when he or 
she lacks alternative mechanisms (such as formal authority) 
to induce the provider’s cooperation. The effects of network 
closure on the performance of the provider, however, are less 
obvious. On the one hand, network closure can make it easier 
for the provider to invest time and energy in the transfer, 
because it removes barriers such as lack of trust for the 
acquirer (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). On the other hand, the 
cooperative norms associated with network closure should 
raise the provider’s cost of not cooperating, effectively 
diminishing the freedom to decide how to allocate time and 
energy to the multiple demands on his or her time. The more 
the provider can beneﬁ t from maintaining this freedom, the 
higher the costs he or she may incur for having to provide 
help in relationships embedded in common third parties, and 
the lower his or her performance. We examined the effects 
of closure on performance in an analysis of individual perfor-
mance in a worldwide sample of investment bankers working 
for a large ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rm in 2001. Our data allowed us 
to map knowledge exchange relations among the bankers 
during a given year and to assess how network closure 
affected them in their roles as acquirers and providers of 
information, as reﬂ ected in their year-end bonus, which is the 
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main means through which investment banks reward 
performance. 
 NETWORK CLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 Social relations entail ties of mutual dependence (Emerson, 
1962: 32), but ties are not necessarily balanced, in the sense 
that the parties are equally dependent on each other. Asym-
metric relations are probably less frequent in ties based on 
ongoing emotional commitment such as friendship, but they 
are common in ties that arise from the division of labor and 
the heterogeneous distribution of resources among special-
ized actors. These ties are familiar to scholars studying 
advice networks (e.g., Brass, 1984), support networks (e.g., 
Wellman, 1979; Carley and Krackhardt, 1996), and intraorgani-
zational politics (e.g., Gargiulo, 1993). They also play a crucial 
role in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), as well as in theories of 
social exchange that underpin resource dependence theory 
(Emerson, 1962; Blau, 1964). Despite the attention they have 
received in various related domains, asymmetric ties have 
been mostly neglected in social capital research in general 
and in studies of how network structures affect individual 
performance in particular. Yet the network structure in which 
asymmetric relationships are embedded can have contrasting 
effects on the performance of the parties, depending on the 
predominant role each party plays in these relationships. 
 Asymmetric ties can be especially important in the informa-
tion exchange networks of knowledge workers. Specialization 
results in a heterogeneous distribution of knowledge and 
information across organizational members (Wegner, 1987; 
Anand, Manz, and Glick, 1998). Although this heterogeneity 
may lead to reciprocity based on knowledge complementari-
ties, it may also result in asymmetric exchanges between 
people. In other words, employee A may need information 
from employee B to do his or her work, but B may not need 
information from A to do his or hers—or at least not to the 
same extent that A needs the information B can provide. 
Insofar as a focal actor (“ego”) engages in asymmetric 
exchanges of information with colleagues (“alters”), he or 
she may enter two substantively different types of relation-
ship with two sets of colleagues: he or she is predominantly 
an “acquirer” of information from one set and a “provider” 
of information to another set of colleagues. 
 The distinction between the acquirer and provider roles in 
asymmetric exchanges is relevant because such asymmetry 
may prompt unbalanced interdependence between the 
parties (Emerson, 1962). Transferring complex information 
and knowledge to colleagues often requires speciﬁ c invest-
ments of time and energy by the source (Hansen, 1999; 
Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Asymmetric exchanges may 
remove an important incentive for the provider to make such 
investments. Displaying deference to the provider may help 
the acquirer attenuate the asymmetry of the exchange (Blau, 
1964), but it will not alter its nature. More importantly, the 
value of deference for the provider may decline rapidly with 
the effort he or she has to put into the transfer. Though 
Closure and Performance
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people would seldom refuse to help colleagues overtly, there 
may be substantial variance in the effort they devote to the 
requests of each of those colleagues. This may result in 
signiﬁ cant variation in the quality and timeliness of the 
information they provide to colleagues, which in turn should 
affect these colleagues’ performance. 
 Several factors can lower the motivation of the provider to 
cooperate with the acquirer in asymmetric exchanges. These 
factors include interpersonal conﬂ ict, competition, and lack of 
trust between the two parties. Although any of these factors 
may be sufﬁ cient to deter the provider from investing time in 
helping the acquirer, they are not necessary. A provider may 
also fail to help the acquirer in situations in which the provider 
would like to help but ﬁ nds that doing so may be at odds with 
the provider’s own interests. Faced with multiple demands 
and preoccupied with meeting his or her own targets, the 
provider has to make choices on how to allocate time and 
resources to each of those demands. An allocation schedule 
that is optimal for the provider may not be so for the acquirer. 
In the absence of forces that help align the priorities of the 
provider with those of the acquirer, the latter may not be able 
to count on the cooperation of the former to the extent that 
he or she needs it. 
 Organizations resort to both formal and informal mechanisms 
to deal with barriers to cooperation created by the presence 
of information transfer costs and asymmetric task interdepen-
dence. The formal mechanisms involve reporting structures 
and incentives (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958). 
Though the value of these mechanisms should not be under-
stated, their effectiveness is limited in knowledge-intensive 
ﬁ rms. A signiﬁ cant part of the information exchanges in these 
ﬁ rms cuts across functional, hierarchical, and even geographi-
cal boundaries (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995), which 
makes reporting lines less consequential to horizontal coop-
eration. People work in complex global matrix structures with 
multiple reporting lines and diffused accountability (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977; Ford and Randolph, 1992). This reduces, 
though does not eliminate, the effectiveness of the formal 
reporting structure as a mechanism to control behavior and 
makes it more difﬁ cult to design and implement incentive 
systems that operate consistently across organizational 
boundaries (Baron and Kreps, 1999: 275). In addition, people 
in these organizations often work on multiple projects simul-
taneously, and the link between behavior and results is not 
always easy to observe (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996). 
 Mindful of the limitation of formal reporting structures and 
incentives to promote knowledge transfer, knowledge-intensive 
ﬁ rms have linked collegial behavior to rewards like bonuses 
and promotions (Rynes, Gerhard, and Parks, 2005). Such 
evaluations, however, do not guarantee that actors will get 
sufﬁ cient collaboration from their potential providers of 
information. Knowing that the opinion of colleagues will be 
systematically collected and used to allocate rewards should 
increase the average attention that providers allocate to 
helping acquirers, even when they do not expect direct 
reciprocation from those acquirers. Yet a collegial evaluation 
system is unlikely to eliminate the variance in the time and 
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energy a provider allocates across the multiple acquirers 
needing his or her help. Where a given acquirer lands in the 
distribution of attention by the necessary providers will be 
consequential for his or her performance. To understand why 
some acquirers may get more help than others, we turn to 
the structure of the exchange network. 
 The Contrasting Effects of Network Closure 
 Informal networks are a major component of the value 
creation process in knowledge-intensive organizations 
(Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995), offering knowledge 
workers alternatives to formal structure to obtain the collabo-
ration of people whose inputs may be crucial to do their work. 
Informal networks can provide two solutions to the problem 
of the provider’s motivation to help the acquirer. The ﬁ rst is 
tie strength. Granovetter (1973) deﬁ ned tie strength as a 
multidimensional concept comprising the duration, frequency, 
and intimacy between the parties, whereas Marsden and 
Campbell (1984) argued that emotional closeness between 
the parties is the best indicator for the underlying concept. 
In addition, strong ties should increase the shared cognition 
between the provider and the acquirer, lowering the cost of 
the transfer (Hansen, 1999; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; 
Levin and Cross, 2004). Strong ties also increase the emo-
tional investment of the provider in the acquirer, potentially 
balancing the asymmetry of the task-related dependence and 
creating incentives for the provider to invest time and energy 
in helping the acquirer (Emerson, 1962; Granovetter, 1985; 
Uzzi, 1997). Strong ties take time to develop, however, and 
thus may not be in place when the need for the exchange 
emerges (Burt, 2005: 104). This is especially the case in the 
rapidly changing environment of large knowledge-intensive 
ﬁ rms, where relying on strong ties alone may cut individuals 
off from important sources of information and support (Levin 
and Cross, 2004). 
 The second informal mechanism to increase the provider’s 
motivation to help the acquirer is network closure—that is, 
the extent to which ego’s contacts have ties with one 
another. The common third parties that characterize densely 
connected networks can act as a surrogate for strong ties, 
providing actors with indirect information on each other that 
can accelerate the emergence of trust, enabling the exchange 
to go forward (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 2005). 
Closure also creates incentives to cooperate because of 
reputation concerns and a high enforcement potential, which 
facilitate the emergence of collaborative norms between 
players (Granovetter, 1985; Raub and Weesie, 1990; 
Gargiulo, 1993). 
 There is direct and indirect evidence of the positive effects 
of network closure on cooperation. Direct evidence comes 
from research on knowledge transfer, showing that network 
closure makes it easier for the provider to transfer knowledge 
to the acquirer (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Indirect evi-
dence comes from studies of innovation and team perfor-
mance. Obstfeld (2005) found that individuals with dense 
networks were more likely to be involved in innovations. Also, 
network closure among team members has been found to 
Closure and Performance
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facilitate coordination and to have a positive effect on team 
performance (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Oh, Chung, and 
Labianca, 2004; Reagans, Zuckerman, and McEvily, 2004). 
Lazega (2001) provided a rich account of the role of network 
closure in providing resources to and enforcing cooperative 
norms among partners in a law ﬁ rm. Similar arguments have 
been made by scholars studying interorganizational relations. 
Ahuja (2000) stressed the role of network closure in overcom-
ing opportunism and reported that network closure among a 
ﬁ rm’s partners increases the likelihood of innovation. Integrat-
ing these results, Burt (2005) argued that network closure 
within the team enhances the team’s ability to undertake 
concerted action and take advantage of the information 
brokerage opportunities in the larger organization. 
 Although these papers provide direct and indirect evidence 
that network closure can facilitate knowledge exchange and 
prevent cooperation failures, they do not explore the possibil-
ity that network closure may have fundamentally different 
effects for the acquirer and the provider of information in 
asymmetric exchanges. This possibility is implicit in one of 
the mechanisms that account for the effect of closure on 
cooperation. The reputation and norm-enforcing mechanisms 
associated with network closure should help an actor perform 
his or her acquirer role by inducing contacts to act more 
cooperatively than they might have done otherwise. These 
same mechanisms, however, may have the opposite effect 
in an actor’s provider role. Faced with the choice between 
allocating time to an embedded relationship and another that 
is not, a provider may be compelled to focus on the embed-
ded relationship, even if he or she might have made a differ-
ent choice in the absence of that embeddedness. Conversely, 
lack of communication between contacts enhances the 
provider’s ability to avoid concerted control from these 
contacts, which results in greater freedom to act as he or she 
sees ﬁ t. A similar mechanism was also invoked by Merton 
(1957: 114) to explain how social structure can affect role 
performance: “To the extent that the social structure insulates 
the individual from having his activities known to members of 
his role-set, he is the less subject to competing pressures” 
(see also Goode, 1960, for the effect of “compartmentaliza-
tion” in reducing role strain). More recently, Gargiulo and 
Benassi (2000) provided illustrative evidence of the negative 
consequences of losing the freedom to act in knowledge 
exchange networks. Network closure has two faces: actors 
may beneﬁ t from social pressure when it is applied to others 
but will pay a cost when such pressure is applied to them. 
Actors prefer to beneﬁ t from social control but also want to 
avoid its costs. 
 The previous discussion suggests that the effects of network 
closure on performance may depend on the role ego plays 
toward an alter in the knowledge exchange network. In 
relationships in which ego acts predominantly as an acquirer 
of information, he or she should beneﬁ t from a dense net-
work of relationships among alters, because the presence 
of common third parties is likely to induce an alter to invest 
more time and energy in providing ego with the information 
necessary to do his or her job. Conversely, in relationships in 
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which ego acts fundamentally as a provider of information, 
such network closure should be detrimental to ego, because 
a dense web of communication ties between alters makes it 
more difﬁ cult for ego to play off competing demands against 
each other, allocating time and energy as he or she sees ﬁ t. 
Following this reasoning, we predict: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): The performance of a knowledge worker 
increases with the density of ties in his or her information acquirer 
role relationships. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): The performance of a knowledge worker 
decreases with the density of ties in his or her information provider 
role relationships. 
 The reasoning above does not assume that having a dense 
network of acquirer relationships is costless to ego, nor that 
there are no beneﬁ ts to network closure in relationships in 
which ego is fundamentally a provider in the exchange. What 
it does assume is that, on average, the trade-off between the 
costs and beneﬁ ts of network closure is positive in acquirer 
relationships and negative in provider relationships. In the 
acquirer role, the most obvious cost of network closure is 
redundancy. The information advantages associated with 
sparse networks are based on the idea that redundancy 
increases with the density of ties among contacts (Burt, 1992, 
2004). Simply put, some redundancy is a cost ego might have 
to pay to induce alters to invest sufﬁ cient time and energy in 
helping ego. The harder it is for ego to induce the cooperation 
of alters, the more he or she should beneﬁ t from closure in 
his or her acquirer role relationships. 
 On the provider’s side, there can also be beneﬁ ts associated 
with providing information to a densely connected set of 
alters. First, because connected alters are likely to have 
greater overlap of knowledge with ego, it should be easier for 
ego to provide complex information to embedded alters than 
to people who do not work with one another (Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003). Second, the provider may also economize on 
transfer costs, as information provided to one alter can be 
passed onto other alters. The beneﬁ ts of providing informa-
tion to a dense group of colleagues, however, may come at a 
cost for ego, because the visibility and credit for providing 
such information are likely to diminish when localized among 
a relatively narrow, cliquish pool of people. Moreover, econo-
mies of transfer are less likely to happen as the knowledge 
increases in complexity, because the quality and accuracy of 
the information reaching the second alter may suffer. Third, 
communication between alters may facilitate the formation 
of clear expectations about how ego should attend to their 
needs, which should make it easier for ego to play the 
provider role (Podolny and Baron, 1997). The logic behind this 
last argument is familiar to scholars who have reﬂ ected on 
the effects of multiple reporting lines in matrix organizations 
(e.g., Davis and Lawrence, 1977; Ford and Randolph, 1992). 
In these ﬁ rms, a manager’s performance may suffer when his 
or her functional and regional bosses fail to communicate and, 
as a result, may put conﬂ icting demands on the manager, 
who would not be able to deﬂ ect these demands by pushing 
them up. This argument implies that control on ego’s 
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behavior resides with the connected alters, who come to a 
negotiated understanding on how ego should attend to their 
demands. This control can beneﬁ t ego if he or she is clearly 
accountable to a few alters, as is the case in exchanges 
embedded in authority relationships. But the more an actor’s 
job requires independence in deciding how to allocate resources 
to the multiple demands on his or her time, the lower the 
beneﬁ ts he or she can expect from network closure in the 
provider role. 
 Acknowledging the potential costs of a dense network in the 
acquirer role and the potential beneﬁ ts to a dense network in 
the provider role reminds us that a given social structure 
always entails constraints and opportunities. Although actors 
may beneﬁ t from the diversity of information and the auto-
nomy of sparse networks, they must weigh these beneﬁ ts 
against the potential costs of lacking the means to secure the 
cooperation of alters. Conversely, although actors may beneﬁ t 
from the cooperative norms of a closed network, these 
beneﬁ ts must be weighed against the cost of reduced 
autonomy to do their work as they see ﬁ t. The resolution of 
this endemic trade-off depends on the role ego plays in 
asymmetric exchanges. As an acquirer, ego may beneﬁ t more 
from network closure, which induces the provider to cooper-
ate. As a provider, ego should beneﬁ t more from the freedom 
from control bestowed by networks rich in structural holes. 
This line of reasoning suggests that the beneﬁ ts of network 
closure should be less apparent for acquirers who have other 
means to induce the cooperation of providers. Similarly, the 
costs of network closure for providers should increase with 
the importance of maintaining independence from their 
acquirers to do their job. Therefore, factors that increase the 
inﬂ uence of the acquirer or the importance of maintaining 
independence for the providers should moderate the main 
effects of network closure on performance. 
 Formal Rank as a Moderator 
 Contingencies associated with individual characteristics are 
familiar to scholars studying the effects of network structures 
on individual outcomes. For example, Burt (1992) reported 
that women and minorities were less likely to beneﬁ t from 
networks rich in structural holes. Subsequently, Burt (1997) 
also showed that the beneﬁ ts derived from bridging structural 
holes were more valuable to managers who had few imposed 
guidelines on how they should work and hence more freedom 
in how they fulﬁ lled their responsibilities. An important contin-
gency for the effects of network structure in knowledge-
intensive organizations is formal rank. 
 Actors’ rank in the hierarchy of the organization can affect 
their ability to secure colleagues’ collaboration, as well as 
the value of maintaining control over the various demands on 
their time. Hierarchy is an obvious lever for control in most 
organizations, and its effects are not limited to direct reporting 
relationships. Differences in formal rank play a role even in 
organizations in which information and knowledge ﬂ ow 
mostly through informal networks. Although these exchanges 
may occur outside formal reporting lines, the parties are 
usually aware of each other’s rank, and this awareness is 
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likely to affect their behavior in the exchanges. Simply put, 
junior members should face more difﬁ culties than senior 
executives in getting the attention of their potential providers. 
Thus the beneﬁ ts of a dense acquirer network should be 
more apparent for junior executives and less apparent for 
senior executives, who can substitute the power conferred by 
their rank as an alternative lever to induce cooperation. We 
should expect, therefore, that the beneﬁ ts of network closure 
for acquirers decrease systematically with their rank, with the 
highest beneﬁ ts accruing to the lowest ranks. Hence: 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): The positive effect of ego network density in the 
acquirer role on the performance of a knowledge worker decreases 
with rank, such that the effect is the strongest for workers in the 
lowest rank. 
 Hypothesis 3 is consistent with the possibility of a trade-off 
between the beneﬁ ts and costs of closure to ego. The lower 
ego’s rank, the more he or she may need to rely on network 
closure to induce the collaboration of colleagues. Additionally, 
because their work typically involves less complex tasks, 
employees in lower ranks might derive fewer beneﬁ ts from 
having access to diverse information. The opposite is true for 
high-ranking individuals: they should be less reliant on net-
work closure to induce the cooperation of providers, while 
deriving maximum beneﬁ t from access to non-redundant 
information. Hence the positive effect of network closure in 
the acquirer role should be the highest for the lowest ranks 
and dwindle (or possibly even reverse) as acquirers move up 
the hierarchy. 
 The effect of network closure across ranks should be the 
opposite for relationships in which ego plays the provider role. 
Rank among knowledge workers is closely associated with 
the scale and scope of their responsibilities. The higher the 
rank, the more they should beneﬁ t from having the freedom 
to decide how to allocate time and energy to the multiple 
demands on their time, and the stronger the negative effect 
of having to provide information to a set of interconnected 
alters. This argument is not new. Burt, Jannotta, and Mahoney 
(1998) found that networks rich in structural holes are more 
valuable for managers in more senior ranks. Because 
people in senior ranks are more “the authors of their jobs” 
(Burt, 1997: 352), social contexts that are low in control 
should make it easier for those actors to excel at their work. 
What is new is our suggestion that the negative effect of 
network closure (or lack of structural holes) holds only for 
the relationship set in which the executive is fundamentally a 
provider of information but not when he or she is an acquirer. 
Hence: 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): The negative effect of ego network density in 
the information provider role on the performance of a knowledge 
worker increases with rank, such that the effect is the strongest for 
workers in the highest rank. 
 The theorizing behind hypothesis 4 indicates that the senior 
bankers in our study should suffer from being compelled to 
help colleagues in a dense provider network. Yet if bankers 
can use their rank to induce cooperation from colleagues, one 
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might speculate that they could also do so to ignore requests 
from colleagues, irrespective of the network structure. Using 
authority to induce cooperation, however, is not the same 
as using it to withhold cooperation. Collegial behavior is 
expected in the bank, which is why the bank measures it. 
A senior banker can probably get away with ignoring some 
colleagues needing help to concentrate on others, but doing 
this in a dense network is risky. Colleagues may quickly arrive 
at a common view of the banker as uncooperative, which 
goes against the expectations of senior management and 
may diminish this banker’s ability to get help when he or she 
needs it. We tested these hypotheses on a dataset compris-
ing the top four ranks of employees in the equities division of 
a global investment bank. 
 METHODS 
 The data used in this paper come from the equities division of 
a major ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rm. In 2001, the year covered by 
our data, the division participated in the global primary and 
secondary markets for equity, equity-linked, and equity 
derivative products in 31 countries and 100 stock markets in 
Europe, the Asia-Paciﬁ c area, Africa, and the Americas. Equity 
employees, which we refer to as bankers for simplicity, are 
assigned to one of the 41 main business units organized in 
global functions (sales, research, trading, and business 
management). Each business unit typically carries out sales, 
trading, or research activities in a given market, based on 
regional and volume considerations (e.g., “US Trading,” 
“Latin America Research”), whereas Business Management 
is responsible for the active management of ﬁ nancial risk. 
Bankers are also members of an industry group (e.g., “Auto-
motive”), albeit this is a secondary afﬁ liation in their global 
matrix. On average, a business unit employs 55 bankers who 
are eligible for bonuses. These are the bankers included in our 
study. They correspond to the ranks of associate director 
(lowest), director (or vice-president), executive director (senior 
vice-president), and managing director (highest). Consistent 
with the ﬂ at structure of these organizations, 24 percent of 
the bankers have direct reports, albeit the proportion of those 
who do increases with rank, going from only 2 percent for 
associates to 81 percent for managing directors. These 
reporting relationships, however, do not necessarily dictate 
the work a banker does, as one would expect in a traditional 
organization. Bankers collaborate with many people across 
the ﬁ rm, depending on the ongoing business needs. Ranks 
do not map onto speciﬁ c jobs: industry analysts, salespeople, 
and traders can be found in all ranks. Yet a banker’s rank does 
affect the volume and the complexity of the deals in which 
the banker participates. As bankers move up in the ranks, the 
importance of the deals in which they participate and their 
client exposure increases, as does their need to acquire and 
process information. 
 Investment banks typically use an up-or-out promotion 
system, which fuels intense competition within ranks. 
Bankers also compete for the valuable but hard-to-come-by 
attention of senior colleagues. Success depends ultimately on 
performance, but this is a function of having the chance to 
participate in the most lucrative deals and of being able to 
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obtain the support necessary to execute those deals. The 
formal structure serves to identify pools of knowledge that 
can be tapped for speciﬁ c deals, as well as to maintain control 
on the large amounts of money transacted on a daily basis. 
Yet identifying whose help bankers should enlist to carry out 
their job and ensuring that such help is forthcoming is largely 
the realm of informal networks. 
 In what is probably the best in-depth scholarly study of the 
workings of investment banks, Eccles and Crane (1988: 38) 
stressed that “the complexity of the deals, the speed with 
which many of them are done, and the ﬁ nancial stakes 
involved require a high level of coordination among bankers 
across functions and hierarchical levels.” If anything, the 
speed of product innovation and the growing interconnected-
ness of ﬁ nancial markets have made the need for coordination 
even stronger today. Traders must be willing to share infor-
mation with other traders, salespeople, and research analysts 
to respond to market movements, and they must be willing 
to do so at a pace that matches the speed of these market 
movements. Yet how much time and energy a banker puts 
into helping a speciﬁ c colleague must be balanced against the 
opportunity cost of investing time on this colleague. Although 
the formal structure does provide the background for busi-
ness decisions, such decisions are made by the people 
directly in contact with the market, and those people must 
ﬁ gure out how to obtain the information and the help they 
need when they need them. This is why the structure of an 
investment bank is more appropriately regarded as a complex 
and changing network of internal ties between various 
functional specialists, in which resources are combined to 
respond to the unique characteristics of the deal (Eccles and 
Crane, 1988: 47). 
 Aware of the importance of collaboration networks and of the 
difﬁ culties in securing such collaboration in the fast-paced, 
high-pressure environment in which their employees operate, 
investment banks have implemented evaluation tools that 
seek to measure the extent to which bankers add value for 
colleagues, irrespective of the place they occupy in the formal 
structure. Paramount among these tools is a system of 
cross-evaluations by which bankers assess the value that 
individual colleagues have added to their own work over a 
given period (see Kane and Lawler, 1978, for a discussion). 
In our setting, bonus-eligible bankers are asked to identify 
colleagues with whom they had “substantial business 
interactions” during the prior year and to evaluate those 
colleagues based on the value they have added to the bank-
ers’ own work. This approach differs from the traditional 
360-degree process used in other investment banks in one 
crucial aspect: rather than being nominated by the evaluated 
person or by a third party (typically a senior manager), the 
evaluator independently decides whom to evaluate, following 
the guidelines established by the bank. The ﬁ rm uses these 
cross-evaluations in bonus deliberations, which take place 
about two months after the completion of the exercise. 
Bankers are expected to place colleagues in one of four 
quartiles, allocating approximately equal numbers of colleagues 
to each quartile. This prevents the “grade inﬂ ation” that often 
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affects peer evaluations and ensures discriminatory power in 
the results (Kane and Lawler, 1978). 
 The bank relies on a proprietary on-line system to help 
employees evaluate their colleagues. The system displays a 
roster with the full names of the colleagues an employee may 
evaluate, organized by business unit. It also contains very 
explicit instructions on who should be evaluated and on what 
the content of such evaluations should be: 
 When ranking your colleagues it is important to assign the ranks 
in terms of “ usefulness to you ” and not your perception of their 
contribution to the bank in general. . . . You are being asked to rank 
individuals that you know in terms of their real contribution to  your 
business , not their popularity, not their reputation, and not your per-
ception of their contribution to the business as a whole [ emphases 
in the original ]. 
 When evaluating a speciﬁ c colleague, the instructions ask the 
banker to take into consideration criteria such as how effec-
tively this colleague communicates with the evaluator, his or 
her responsiveness to the requests of the evaluator’s internal 
and external clients, his or her sharing of information and 
resources with the evaluator, and his or her technical compe-
tence. A banker is free to choose whom he or she evaluates, 
although the choices are limited to colleagues working in a 
subset of business units deemed to have regular business 
transactions with the unit of the focal banker, as well as to 
colleagues in his or her own unit. Thus a banker may evaluate 
(or be evaluated by) any colleague in his or her own unit or 
in the units deemed interdependent with his or her unit. 
Although bankers eventually know the mean evaluation they 
received from colleagues, they will not know who evaluated 
them, nor the content of the speciﬁ c evaluations given by 
each colleague. 
 Although the grid that deﬁ nes the pattern of evaluations 
between business units is symmetric, individual evaluations 
are not necessarily so. In fact, only 34 percent of the evalua-
tions are reciprocated, and the values of the ratings may 
differ. This is not surprising, given the speciﬁ c instructions of 
the exercise and the heterogeneous distribution of knowledge 
and expertise in the ﬁ rm. It is perfectly possible that ego 
needed help from alter while alter did not need help from ego. 
We interpreted non-reciprocal ties as indicators of asymmetric 
exchanges between bankers . Three elements support this 
interpretation. First, non-reciprocation is different from failure 
to reciprocate. If alter needed help from ego but this help was 
not forthcoming, alter should have placed ego in the lowest 
quartile according to the instructions—and most likely would 
have had an incentive to do so. Second, the system makes it 
unlikely that non-reciprocation would have resulted from poor 
name recollection. In addition to having a roster of all the 
colleagues they could evaluate, bankers were also asked to 
indicate whether they were acquainted with colleagues they 
did not evaluate, making casual omissions unlikely. If one 
considers acquaintanceship and business ties, reciprocation 
more than doubles, reaching 70 percent. This suggests that 
the absence of reciprocal evaluations between ego and alter 
most likely results from a conscious decision by alter (or ego) 
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to omit the other party from the evaluation. Given the instruc-
tions of the exercise, decisions to avoid giving an evaluation 
to a colleague were most likely driven by the asymmetric 
nature of the exchange between the bankers. 
 Consistent with the wording of the instructions, we inter-
preted an evaluation from banker  i (ego) to banker  j (alter) as 
an indicator that  i depended on  j on matters directly related to 
 i’ s work and needed  j ’s help. In the context of our study, this 
need could have resulted from two different situations. First, 
ego needed expert knowledge from alter. Second, ego and 
alter worked on the same project. Ego likely sought alter’s 
help in the ﬁ rst situation. The alternative (ego acknowledged 
unsolicited help offered by alter) should be rare in the com-
petitive environment of investment banks. Interviews with 
industry participants, descriptions of their work environment 
(e.g., Lewis, 1989), and the existence of evaluation systems 
like the one described here attest to the difﬁ culty of securing 
collegial help in these organizations. The second situation 
(ego and alter worked together on the same project) can 
result in either asymmetric or mutual dependence, depending 
on the nature of the task interdependence. The asymmetric 
dependence case is akin to the ﬁ rst situation (ego needed inputs 
from alter, but alter did not need inputs from ego), except that 
in the context of the project, a speciﬁ c request by ego might 
not have been necessary. Mutual dependence should have 
prompted reciprocated ratings, which account for one-third of 
the cases in our data. Such mutual dependence should be more 
common among peers than among people in different ranks, 
which is consistent with the observed association between the 
proportion of reciprocated ties and the proportion of peers in the 
bankers’ ego networks ( r = .16;  p < .001). 
 We used the dyadic evaluations collected by the bank in the 
second half of October 2001 to create a square matrix in 
which cell  i,j contains the evaluation banker  i gave banker  j. 
The matrix represents the network of information and 
resource exchange among the bonus-eligible employees in 
the equities division and provides the basis for computing our 
network variables. It comprises all the 2,263 employees in the 
equities division, including 176 bankers who did not complete 
the exercise. In 47 of these cases, the reason for not partici-
pating was that they left the bank during the year and were 
not eligible for bonuses. Although missing data on key indepen-
dent variables forced us to omit them from the statistical 
analysis, bankers who did not evaluate anybody could still 
have been evaluated by colleagues, and those ties could have 
affected the structure of the network. Therefore we kept 
non-respondents in the matrix and evaluated the impact of 
the non-response on the statistical results. 
 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this study is the annual bonus 
received by the banker for performance in the 2001 calendar 
year. A banker’s annual compensation comprises salary and 
a variable bonus, which is a substantial part of the total sum. 
In this industry, salary is largely determined by the formal 
position in the organization (see Burt, 1997: 350, for a similar 
observation using equivalent data). Bonuses are the main way 
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in which investment banks recognize individual efforts and 
value added to the ﬁ rm. Bonus decisions take place after the 
cross-evaluation exercise that provides our network data and 
explicitly incorporate the results of this evaluation, allowing 
for a clear causal link between networks and bonuses. For 
conﬁ dentiality reasons, the bank could only provide us with 
z-scores of the dollar value of the bonuses for the bankers 
in the equity division. Typically, bonus ﬁ gures are strongly 
skewed in this industry, with a few bankers earning substan-
tially larger bonuses than the mean. Our data are not an 
exception: the top earner received a bonus that was 
13.23 standard deviations above the mean (zero), whereas 
the lowest bonus was just .67 standard deviations below the 
mean. To compensate for this, we used the natural logarithm 
of the z-scores in our analysis, taken after rescaling the values 
to eliminate negative numbers. 
 Network Variables 
 For each banker, we measured network size and density in 
his or her acquirer and provider role relationship sets, as well 
as the proportion of reciprocated ties and the density across 
role relationship sets. Although we were not theoretically 
interested in the effects of network size, holding size con-
stant was necessary to obtain accurate estimates of the 
density effect. In addition, controlling for network size should 
account for a possible unobserved tendency to over- or 
underreport ties (acquirer size) or for popularity effects 
(provider size). The acquirer relationship set includes all 
colleagues evaluated by the focal banker in the cross-evaluation 
exercise. The provider relationship set includes all colleagues 
who evaluated the focal banker. Our key independent variable 
is the closure of the banker’s information network. We 
measured it using network density, deﬁ ned as the percentage 
of existing ties to the maximum possible number of ties 
among alters in the speciﬁ c set of role relationships. The 
density measure varies from 0 (no ties between alters) to 100 
(each alter is connected to every other alter in the banker’s 
network). 1 We used the natural logarithms of the network 
variables in our estimations to correct for the skewness in the 
distribution of some of these variables. 
 We measured  acquirer network size as the number of people 
evaluated by ego. It corresponds to ego’s out-degree in the 
information exchange network.  Provider network size is the 
number of people who evaluated ego. It corresponds to ego’s 
in-degree in the exchange network.  Reciprocated ties mea-
sures the proportion of exchange relationships in which the 
focal banker acted as both acquirer and provider of informa-
tion. On average, only one-third of the exchanges were 
reciprocated, but the proportion of exchanges in which ego 
acted as both acquirer and provider varied from 0 to 92 per-
cent in our sample. The presence of reciprocated exchanges 
resulted in a partial overlap between acquirer and provider 
relationships. To remove the effect of reciprocation from our 
estimates, we controlled for the proportion of reciprocated 
ties in the banker’s network. 
 Acquirer network density is the ratio of existing ties to the 
maximum number of possible ties between alters in the 
1
We also considered using valued density 
(deﬁ ned as the mean evaluation among 
alters connected to ego in a speciﬁ c role) 
but decided in favor of the standard 
proportional measure for theoretical and 
empirical reasons. Theoretically, we were 
interested in the effect of communication 
among alters as “pipes” through which 
stories about ego’s behavior could be 
disseminated, creating the reputation 
effects that are behind the control 
properties of network closure. The 
communication resulting from “substan-
tial business interactions” between alters 
should sufﬁ ce to disseminate these 
stories. The denser the network, the more 
any speciﬁ c alter is likely to hear similar 
stories about ego, which should amplify 
and consolidate the reputation of ego. 
Empirically, the standard measures of 
density used in our analysis are strongly 
correlated with valued measures (r = .99 
for both acquirer and provider roles) and, 
as one could expect, had similar effects 
on the outcome variable.
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banker’s acquirer network, multiplied by 100. Because we 
were interested in the role of communication between alters 
in disseminating stories about ego’s behavior and because 
such communication could take place irrespective of the 
direction of the task-related information ﬂ ow, we considered 
all ties between alters when computing all density measures. 
 Provider network density is the ratio of existing ties to the 
maximum number of possible ties between alters in the 
banker’s provider role, multiplied by 100.  Acquirer-provider 
network density is the ratio of existing ties to the maximum 
number of possible ties cutting across exclusive (i.e., non-
reciprocated) acquirer and provider relationships, multiplied by 
100. Though we did not theorize speciﬁ cally about the effect 
of ties across roles, they are likely to have an effect on 
outcomes, and these effects might contaminate the esti-
mates of the effects of acquirer and provider density. The 
net effect that ties across role relationships should have on 
performance is not straightforward. On the one hand, such 
ties should have a similar reputation effect as ties within each 
role, so they should induce the collaboration of alters in 
acquirer relationships. On the other hand, ties bridging 
between roles should constrain ego in the provider role and 
might undermine ego’s position as a broker of information 
between the two groups of colleagues, which should nega-
tively affect his or her performance. If this is so, leveraging 
provider relationships to inﬂ uence acquirer relationships may 
be too costly for ego. In the absence of a clear prediction, we 
simply used this variable as a control to account for the 
potential effect that cross-role relationships may have on 
ego’s performance. If ego has (non-reciprocated) acquirer 
relationships with a set of 10 people and provider relation-
ships with another set of 10 people, there can be a maxi-
mum of 200 directed relationships across the two sets. 
Density is obtained by dividing the observed count over the 
maximum possible number of relationships between provid-
ers and acquirers and multiplying the result by 100. To 
ensure that we captured the effect of ties that truly cut 
across roles, we only considered exchanges between alters 
not engaged in reciprocal exchanges with ego when com-
puting cross-role density. 
 Acquirer network hierarchy measures the centralization of 
ego’s acquirer network. A dense acquirer network should 
increase the likelihood that alters would invest time and 
energy in attending to ego’s needs out of reputation concerns 
operating through common third parties. The reputation 
mechanism may also operate if alters are connected to a 
central player in ego’s acquirer network, but not to each 
other. Such a hierarchical network (Burt, 1992: 70) is likely to 
have relatively low density, especially in large networks. Most 
alter-alter ties are missing, except for those linking alters to 
the central player. If ego can get leverage on alter through the 
central player, a banker with a relatively low acquirer network 
density should still be able to induce the cooperation of his or 
her colleagues, which should improve his or her performance. 
We controlled for the extent to which ego had a hierarchical 
acquirer network using the concentration measure proposed 
by Burt (1992: 71). 
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 Control Variables 
 Our models controlled for a number of variables that could 
affect the bonus received by bankers, as well as the size and 
structure of their exchange networks. These variables capture 
attributes of the focal banker (sex, age, seniority, rank), the 
expected quality of the people providing inputs to the focal 
banker (alters’ mean evaluation), and the banker’s evaluation 
from colleagues (ego’s mean evaluation). In addition, we 
controlled for the effects of the business unit of the focal 
banker by introducing unit ﬁ xed effects. 
 Burt (1992, 1997) and Ibarra (1993b) argued for the effects of 
gender on social networks and their effects on performance. 
We therefore controlled for  gender with a dummy variable set 
to one if the banker is male.  Age is the age of the banker (in 
years) in 2001.  Seniority is the number of years the banker 
had been with the ﬁ rm by 2001. Seniority can be interpreted 
as a proxy for experience and knowledge, and hence human 
capital. It has been found to be related to technical innovation 
as assessed by other employees (Ibarra, 1993a) and to 
performance (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001; Burt, 2004). 
Moreover, seniority may have an effect on network structure, 
as networks may become denser over time (Burt, 1992). 
Although seniority is typically correlated with age, the correla-
tion is not especially strong in our data ( r = .46,  p < .001). This 
correlation is weaker when we use the natural logarithm of 
seniority, which reduces the skewness of the distribution 
( r = .35). Including both variables allows us to parcel out the 
effects of seniority and age on bonuses. Although we do not 
have information on educational level, practically all bankers in 
our sample are likely to have completed prestigious university 
degrees and even Masters’ of Business Administration, as 
major business schools are the main source of recruits into 
the associate rank in this industry (Liaw, 2006: 41). 
 Rank is the corporate title of the employee in 2001. Rank is 
both an important control and the moderator for network 
closure effects on performance (H3 and H4). In our data, rank 
alone explains 65 percent of the variance in bonuses (see 
Burt, 1997: 350, for a similar result). Our sample comprises 
the associate director, director, executive director, and 
managing director ranks, in this hierarchical order. We repre-
sented these ranks with three dummy variables, with the 
lowest rank (associate director) being the omitted category. 
 Alters’ mean evaluation is the average of the evaluations 
received by each of the colleagues evaluated by the focal 
banker—that is, colleagues in the banker’s acquirer relation-
ship set. Our argument posits that bankers’ bonuses are 
affected by their ability to acquire information from col-
leagues. Though the quality of this information should be a 
function of the attention colleagues devote to a focal banker, 
it might be also affected by the quality of those colleagues. 
Other things being equal, a banker who acquires information 
from high-quality colleagues should do better than one who 
has to rely on low-quality ones. We used the mean evaluation 
received by each of the colleagues evaluated by the focal 
banker as an indicator of their quality and averaged these 
scores across all these colleagues. Holding the expected 
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quality of alters constant facilitates our interpretation of 
coefﬁ cients of network density effects as measuring the 
extent to which the banker is able to realize more (or less) of 
that expected quality, which in turn should affect his or her 
performance. 
 Ego’s mean evaluation is the average evaluation received by 
the focal banker. The bank explicitly uses these averages in 
bonus decisions. The evaluation can also be interpreted as 
a measure of the reputation of the focal banker. Although 
bankers are speciﬁ cally instructed to ignore the reputation of 
colleagues when giving their evaluation of how much value 
this colleague added to their own work, the mean score of all 
the dyadic evaluations of a banker are likely to correlate with 
his or her reputation for helping colleagues and creating value 
in the ﬁ rm. This, in turn, can make it easier for the banker to 
obtain the cooperation of colleagues. By holding constant the 
mean evaluation obtained by the focal banker, we removed 
the effect that such evaluation has on the bonus decisions 
and controlled for possible reputation effects that can affect 
the banker’s ability to get help from colleagues. 
 Direct reports captures the number of people reporting to the 
banker. Twenty-two percent of the bankers are responsible 
for supervising the performance of one or more colleagues, 
though these colleagues may often work in deals that do not 
include their supervisor. Bonus decisions are likely to factor 
into a banker’s managerial responsibilities, which should also 
add to the status of the banker in the ﬁ rm. Including the 
number of direct reports controls for these effects. 
 Knowledge diversity captures the level of non-redundancy in 
the banker’s knowledge exchange network. Network density 
is commonly used as a structural correlate of non-redundancy 
in a network. An alternative is structural equivalence (Burt, 
1992, 1997: 340). Two actors are structurally equivalent to the 
extent that they are linked to the same third parties in the 
network. The more two bankers enter exchanges with the 
same colleagues, the more likely they are to tap into similar 
pools of knowledge and the more similar their own expertise. 
Following Burt (1976), we used the Euclidean distance 
between actors to measure their structural equivalence in the 
knowledge exchange network. This measure varies from 
zero, when the two actors enter exchanges with exactly the 
same third parties, to a maximum that depends on the size 
and the structure of the whole network. The larger the 
Euclidean distance, the less equivalent the actors are, and the 
less redundant their knowledge stock. To compute the level 
of non-redundancy in a banker’s network, we averaged the 
Euclidean distances between all pairs of colleagues in that 
banker’s ego network (see Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008, 
for a similar measure). 
 Although network density and structural equivalence are both 
valid structural correlates of redundancy in an ego network, 
each measure relies on different assumptions about what 
drives such redundancy. Density focuses on the local 
exchanges within a cluster. Structural equivalence considers 
the pattern of exchange of the actor in the whole network. 
For an ego network, the difference between the two 
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measures should be negligible at high levels of density. In 
such a network, a large proportion of the alter’s ties is likely 
to involve other alters also connected to ego, so alters are 
both members of a cohesive cluster and equivalent. At low 
or intermediate levels of density, however, alters are likely 
to have many ties that do not involve other alters in ego’s 
network, so they are less equivalent. An analysis of the 
relationship between equivalence and density in the banker’s 
ego networks conﬁ rms this pattern. Holding size constant, 
the effect of ego-network density on the lack of structural 
equivalence between alters (our measure of knowledge 
diversity) is negligible for networks below the mean density 
(.03  t- value, N  = 1264) and negative for networks above mean 
density ( β = –.199, –25.48  t- value, N = 736). Insofar as lack of 
structural equivalence among alters captures the diversity of 
their knowledge stock, bankers with low to intermediate 
acquirer network density should still have access to diverse 
sources of information and opportunities to add value, despite 
their having moderately dense ego networks. 
 Business unit ﬁ xed effects . Because bonuses partly reﬂ ect 
market conditions, the size of a banker’s bonus depends on 
the business unit in which he or she works. Differences in 
bonuses across business units are important in our data. For 
example, the average 2001 bonus of bankers in the US 
Research unit was 1.44 standard deviations above the mean 
for the equities division, whereas the bonus of bankers in 
Japan Research and Europe-UK trading were .27 and .18 
below the mean, respectively. In addition, a banker’s unit also 
affects the number of colleagues who can evaluate (and be 
evaluated by) the banker. This number depends on the size 
of the banker’s unit as well as of the combined size of all the 
units that are deemed interdependent with the banker’s unit 
for the purposes of the cross-evaluations. This introduces 
heterogeneity in the number of potential colleagues each 
banker can have in his or her network. To account for this 
heterogeneity, we added business unit ﬁ xed effects to our 
estimations. 
 RESULTS 
 Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations 
for all the variables in the analysis. We report the natural 
logarithms for transformed variables but refer to their non-
transformed means for descriptive purposes. On average, 
employees have been with the company for slightly longer 
than six years, and 83 percent are male, with the proportion 
of females decreasing with rank (24 percent of associates 
and 6 percent of managing directors). Seniority ranges from 
a few months to 41 years, which motivates our using a 
log-transformation. The number of alters a banker interacts 
with in acquirer and provider roles is rather large (78 and 
73 people, respectively). As one might expect, the size of the 
provider role varies signiﬁ cantly by rank. On average, associ-
ates are evaluated by 44 colleagues, whereas this number 
increases to 213 for managing directors. The differences are 
less pronounced in the acquirer role, with directors and 
executive directors acquiring information from more col-
leagues (74 and 99 people, respectively) than do associate 
and managing directors (56 and 53 people). Correlations 
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between the variables are generally low except for network 
variables (size, density, information diversity), but they are 
unlikely to create multicollinearity problems, given the sample 
size. 
 Table 2 presents OLS estimates and robust standard errors 
for the effects of the variables in our study, with ﬁ xed effects 
for 41 business units included in the models. Model 1 is the 
baseline with controls. Model 2 incorporates the network 
effects (size and density by roles). Except for the proportion 
of reciprocated ties and acquirer network hierarchy, we used 
the natural logarithms of the network structure variables, so 
coefﬁ cients for these variables can be interpreted as the 
percentage change in bonus for a 1-percent increment of the 
independent variable. 
 The coefﬁ cients for the control variables reveal a pattern that 
is consistent with other research using similar data (e.g., Burt, 
1997). Rank has the expected strong effect on compensation. 
Holding other controls constant, the bonuses of directors are 
on average about 18 percent higher than the bonuses of 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations*
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 1. Bonus (ln) .402 .385
 2. Gender (1 = male) .832 .374 .15
 3. Age 35.456 6.681 .23 .10
 4. Seniority (ln) 1.660 .822 .16 .12 .35
 5. Director .386 .487 –.14 .01 .04 –.06
 6. Executive director .188 .391 .30 .10 .23 .16 –.38
 7. Managing director .079 .269 .68 .08 .25 .20 –.23 –.14
 8. Direct reports (no.) 1.001 3.049 .47 .10 .16 .17 –.16 .16 .46
 9. Knowledge diversity 16.596 2.841 .34 .00 .03 .12 –.03 .14 .26 .13
10. Alters’ mean evaluation 2.679 .075 .04 –.05 .01 .03 –.08 –.03 .03 .01
11. Ego’s mean evaluation 2.657 .355 .14 .03 –.09 .04 .03 .11 –.02 .10
12. Acquirer network size (ln) 4.079 .792 .15 .09 –.08 .12 .09 .22 –.10 .09
13. Provider network size (ln) 4.009 .749 .58 .05 .11 .23 –.08 .20 .48 .33
14.  Reciprocated ties 
(proportion) .347 .140 –.28 .03 –.14 –.10 .14 .02 –.39 –.10
15. Network hierarchy (acquirer) 4.598 1.597 –.16 .01 –.01 –.06 .02 –.06 –.13 –.11
16. Acquirer-provider density (ln) 3.095 .480 –.20 –.09 –.03 –.14 .07 –.11 –.19 –.19
17. Density acquirer (ln) 3.583 .360 .02 –.04 .09 –.07 –.07 –.20 .25 .03
18. Density provider (ln) 3.658 .396 –.50 –.02 –.12 –.21 .14 –.16 –.45 –.27
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
10. Alters’ mean evaluation –.05
11. Ego’s mean evaluation .03 .09
12. Acquirer network size (ln) .40 –.20 .15
13. Provider network size (ln) .48 –.14 .13 .53
14.  Reciprocated ties 
(proportion) –.52 –.08 .12 .20 –.10
15. Network hierarchy (acquirer) .05 –.06 –.02 –.09 –.28 –.25
16. Acquirer-provider density (ln) –.28 –.04 –.15 –.20 –.23 .12 –.07
17. Density acquirer (ln) –.50 .07 –.13 –.65 –.21 .18 –.39 .37
18. Density provider (ln) –.68 –.04 –.12 –.27 –.63 .47 .00 .43 .46
* N = 2000. Correlations greater than |.05| are signiﬁ cant at p < .01.
Closure and Performance
319/ASQ, June 2009
Table 2 
Effects of Network Closure on Bonuses, by Banker’s Role and Rank (N = 2000)*
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant –.750••• –1.196••• –1.336••• –1.377•••
(.181) (.227) (.196) (.197)
Gender (1 = male) .028••• .034•• .035•• .034••
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
Age (years) –.004••• –.002•• –.002•• –.002••
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Seniority (years, ln) –.032••• –.045••• –.046••• –.044•••
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Director (D) .181••• .157••• .159••• .171•••
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009)
Executive director (ED) .450••• .398••• .396••• .407•••
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.016)
Managing director (MD) 1.107••• .905••• .949••• .703•••
(.054) (.052) (.080) (.089)
Direct reports (no.) .014••• .012••• .012••• .011•••
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Knowledge diversity .015••• .004 .005 .008••
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Alters’ mean evaluation .185•• .279••• .266••• .279•••
(.064) (.064) (.063) (.063)
Ego’s mean evaluation .116••• .097••• .098••• .101•••
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.012)
Acquirer network size (ln) .031•• .031•• .023•
(.010) (.010) (.010)
Provider network size (ln) .085••• .086••• .079•••
(.011) (.011) (.011)
Reciprocated ties (proportion) –.136•• –.143•• –.104•
(.047) (.047) (.045)
Network hierarchy (acquirer) .008• .009• .009•
(.003) (.004) (.003)
Acquirer-provider density (ln) .013 .015 .013
(.009) (.009) (.009)
Density acquirer role (ln) .088•• .137••• .064••
(.026) (.027) (.025)
Density provider role (ln) –.105••• –.102••• .004
(.026) (.025) (.022)
Density acquirer (ln) by D –.076•••
(.019)
Density acquirer (ln) by ED –.085•
(.036)
Density acquirer (ln) by MD –.146
(.130)
Density provider (ln) by D –.098•••
(.021)
Density provider (ln) by ED –.170•••
(.033)
Density provider (ln) by MD –.481••
(.152)
R2 (adjusted) .768 .787 .788 .794
F-test† 23.226••• 4.052•• 24.018•••
• p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001; two-tailed tests.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed effects for 41 business units are included.
† F-tests compare model 2 to model 1 and models 3 and 4 to model 2.
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associate directors (the baseline category), whereas those 
of executive directors and managing directors are 45 and 
111 percent higher, respectively. Although age and seniority 
are positively correlated with bonus ( r = . 23 and .16, respec-
tively), the coefﬁ cients for these variables become negative 
when rank is held constant, a pattern that is typical in the 
industry. Males get higher bonuses than females (see Roth, 
2003, for a similar ﬁ nding), although the difference explained 
by gender alone is only about 3 percent in our sample. As 
expected, both the mean evaluation received by ego and the 
mean evaluation of colleagues from whom he or she acquired 
information have a signiﬁ cant positive effect on bonuses. 
Though the effect of ego’s mean evaluation may simply 
reﬂ ect the fact that the bank uses the cross-evaluation scores 
in bonus decisions, the positive impact of mean colleague’s 
evaluations conﬁ rms the intuition that a banker’s performance 
is signiﬁ cantly affected by the quality of the people in his or 
her acquirer network. 
 Bonuses are also positively affected by the diversity in the 
knowledge stock of the banker’s colleagues, although this 
effect is only apparent in the baseline model. As discussed 
before, for both theoretical reasons and parsimony, we did 
not use different measures of knowledge diversity for the 
acquirer and the provider roles. To ensure the robustness of 
the results, we ran an alternative to model 1 using acquirer 
diversity only. The estimate for the coefﬁ cient is practically 
identical ( β = .011,  p < .001); all other coefﬁ cients remain 
equally signiﬁ cant, and the ﬁ t of the model is unchanged. 
 Model 2 introduces the network variables and results in 
a signiﬁ cant improvement in the model ﬁ t (23.23  F -test, 
 p < .001). The results support our ﬁ rst two hypotheses. 
Acquirer network density has a signiﬁ cant positive effect on 
bonuses, whereas the effect of provider density is negative, 
as predicted by H1 and H2, respectively. The effect of the 
other network variables merits some attention. The more a 
banker is cited as a potential source of inputs—as measured 
by the size of his or her provider network—the higher the 
bonus, which is consistent with the idea that actors beneﬁ t 
from being the object of relationships (Knoke and Burt, 1983). 
The number of people the banker relies upon for acquiring 
information is also positively related to his or her bonus, albeit 
the effect is weaker. This is consistent with the information 
beneﬁ ts associated with large networks (Burt, 1992). 
 A hierarchical acquirer network has a small but signiﬁ cant 
effect on bonuses, which is consistent with our framework 
and with results reported by Burt (1992: 144–148). A hier-
archical acquirer network allows bankers to gain indirect 
leverage on alters through one or a few central players in their 
acquirer network instead of through the many common third 
parties of a dense network. More importantly, holding hier-
archy constant signiﬁ cantly increases the effect of acquirer 
density from  β = .053 (2.41  t- value) to  β = .088 (3.34  t -value). 
This is not surprising. Because most alter-alter ties are 
missing, hierarchical networks are relatively sparse. In our 
sample, the correlation between density and hierarchy in the 
acquirer network is  r = –.39 ( p < .001). If acquirers can exert 
some leverage on their colleagues through a central player, 
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bankers with a sparse but hierarchical network should do 
slightly better than expected given their level of acquirer 
network density. Hence failure to control for acquirer network 
hierarchy results in an underestimation of the effect of 
acquirer network density on bonuses. 
 Information diversity (the extent to which alters are not 
structurally equivalent to one another in ego’s network) was 
signiﬁ cant in the baseline model, but it is not signiﬁ cant in the 
other models, although this may be the result of multicol-
linearity with the network variables. Although the correlation 
between cross-role density and bonuses suggests that ties 
across roles might be detrimental ( r = –.20), the effect is 
non-signiﬁ cant in the multivariate regression. This is consis-
tent with the idea that cross-role ties may have opposite 
effects on ego’s performance, canceling each other out: 
although it may help ego induce the cooperation of alters in 
his or her acquirer relationships, it also diminishes his or her 
freedom in the provider relationships and undermines the 
capacity to broker information between the two groups. 
 Of particular interest for understanding how the bankers’ 
networks affect their bonuses is the negative and signiﬁ cant 
effect of reciprocity. The more a banker engages in reciprocal 
exchanges with colleagues, the lower the bonus. To under-
stand this seemingly puzzling result, it is worth noting that 
reciprocation should have two opposite effects on ego’s 
performance. On the one hand, alters engaged in reciprocal 
exchanges with ego should have greater incentives to invest 
time and energy in helping ego. On the other hand, the 
heterogeneous distribution of knowledge throughout the ﬁ rm 
may render reciprocation a rather inefﬁ cient way to secure 
the information bankers need to do their work. A focus on 
reciprocated ties implicitly limits acquirers to obtaining 
information from people who also need their inputs, even 
when these people do not have the right experience or knowl-
edge for acquirers’ needs. The signiﬁ cant negative coefﬁ cient 
for reciprocation, which is fairly stable across all models and 
consistent with the simple correlation reported in  table 1 , 
suggests that the trade-off between the beneﬁ ts of coopera-
tion in reciprocated relationships and the costs of restricting 
the pool of knowledge a banker can access is clearly negative 
in our sample. This interpretation is consistent with an observed 
negative correlation between the proportion of reciprocated 
ties and the diversity of the information accessed by the 
banker ( r = –.52,  p < .001), highlighting the importance 
of network closure as an alternative route to securing the 
attention of colleagues who should invest time and energy 
in providing information to ego. 
 Models 3 and 4 provide strong evidence for the idea that the 
effects of network closure on a banker’s performance vary 
systematically with rank. Model 3 shows that the positive 
effect of acquirer’s network closure diminishes systematically 
with rank, furnishing support for H3. The positive effect of 
acquirer network density on bonus is 1.56 times the sample 
average for associate directors (the omitted category). For 
every 10 percent increase in density in their acquirer relation-
ships, associates’ bonuses increase by 1.37 percent of a 
standard deviation. This increment may seem small, but it is 
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sizeable considering that almost 75 percent of the variance in 
bonuses is accounted for by rank and business unit and that 
associates’ bonuses range from –.62 to .12 standard devia-
tions from the mean, with a median of –.52. The effect of 
acquirer network density on bonuses for directors and executive 
directors are signiﬁ cantly different than for associate directors, 
and it even reverts for managing directors (.137 – .146 = –.009), 
although in their case the difference in slope is not signiﬁ cant 
( p = .262). The slopes for the effects of acquirer network 
density on bonuses by rank are graphically displayed in the 
top half of  ﬁ gure 1 , plotted over the range of observed density 
values in the sample. 
 Further inspection of the results reveals that the positive 
effect of acquirer network density on bonuses is signiﬁ cant 
for associate directors and directors (73.3 percent of the 
sample), but not for executive and managing directors. 
Speciﬁ cally, the net effect is .060 for directors ( p < .05 ) , .051 
for executive directors, and –.009 for managing directors, 
but the last two coefﬁ cients are not statistically signiﬁ cant. 
Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as evidence that 
upper ranks do not derive any control beneﬁ ts from network 
closure. If this were the case, we should have observed 
negative effects of acquirer network closure on bonuses for 
senior ranks because network closure increases information 
redundancy. The fact that we did not observe such negative 
effects suggests that senior ranks might have also derived 
some control beneﬁ ts from closure in their acquirer network. 
Unlike the effect for associates and directors, the marginal 
contribution of these control beneﬁ ts to the performance of 
the senior ranks seems to have been offset by the increase 
in information redundancy costs. 
 Turning to the provider role, model 4 shows that the effects 
of network density in the provider role are not signiﬁ cant for 
associates ( β = .004;  p = .851) but become stronger and 
negative as they move up the ranks. For managing directors, 
a 10 percent increase in the density of ties among the people 
to whom they provide information results in a 4.8 percent 
decrease in bonus. The bottom half of  ﬁ gure 1 depicts the 
slopes for the different ranks. The net effect of provider 
network density on bonus is –.094 for directors ( p < .001), 
–.166 for executive directors ( p < .001), and –.477 for manag-
ing directors ( p < .01). 
 We ran a number of alternative models to explore in more 
detail the mechanisms behind the observed network closure 
effects. First, we estimated a model using generic (i.e., 
non-role-speciﬁ c) measures of ego network density and size 
and controlling for overall network hierarchy. The positive 
effect of network size remains strong and signiﬁ cant 
( β = .102, 8.13  t- value,  p < .001), but density has no effect on 
bonus when it is computed on the banker’s entire exchange 
network ( β = –.014, –.056  t- value,  p = .576). In other words, 
failure to identify the speciﬁ c role relationships affected by 
network density would mask the effects of network structure 
on bonuses and results in a less adequate understanding of 
how such a structure affects performance among the bank-
ers. Our results are similar to yet differ from those reported 
by Burt (1997), who found strong effects of lack of structural 
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Figure 1. Network closure effects on bonuses, by banker’s role and rank.
holes on bonuses of investment bankers, using the logs of his 
constraint measure (Burt, 1992) but without distinguishing 
between acquirer and provider relationships. Our results 
show that constraint (logged) has a strong negative effect on 
bonuses ( β = –.155, –8.38  t- value,  p < .001). Yet constraint 
scores are an inverse function of ego-network size and a 
direct function of network density. The correlation between 
constraint and size (logged) is –.95 in our sample. The insig-
niﬁ cant coefﬁ cient for overall ego-network density suggests 
that the constraint effect in our sample is driven largely by 
network size, not by structure. The effects of network 
structure only become apparent once the distinction between 
acquirer and provider relationships is introduced. 
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 Second, we investigated whether network closure effects—
especially those in the acquirer role—might vary by gender, 
but we did not ﬁ nd any supporting evidence in our data. We 
further explored gender-speciﬁ c network effects among 
associate directors. Women might beneﬁ t more than men 
might from having closure in their acquirer relationships, but 
such an effect might have been noticeable only for women in 
the lowest rank, where they also constitute a signiﬁ cant 
proportion of the observations (24 percent). But we did not 
ﬁ nd any evidence of gender-speciﬁ c network effects among 
associates, nor did the inclusion of the interaction with gender 
affect the results reported before. 
 These results contrast with those of Burt (1992), who found 
different effects of network structure for women in his 
analysis of middle managers in a large electronics ﬁ rm. Burt 
(1992) reported that women beneﬁ t from hierarchical net-
works, not dense networks. We did not ﬁ nd such an effect 
in our sample either, as the interaction between acquirer 
hierarchy and gender is not signiﬁ cant. Besides differences in 
industry, type of data (ego-centered versus full networks), and 
outcome variable (promotions versus bonuses), the difference 
in results could be due to differences in context. Our sample 
does not display noticeable differences in networks between 
men and women, even within ranks. There are no signiﬁ cant 
differences in network density. In terms of network size, 
women have slightly smaller provider networks (62 versus 73 
for men,  p < .01), but the difference is entirely accounted for 
by rank: provider network size increases with rank whereas 
the proportion of women decreases. Women also have 
smaller acquirer networks (60 versus 73,  p < .001), but the 
difference only holds for associate directors. Women and 
men are equally likely to engage in reciprocated exchanges 
(30 versus 32 percent for men), receive similar evaluations 
from colleagues (2.69 versus 2.68), and have colleagues with 
similar average evaluations in their acquirer networks (2.61 
versus 2.63). Other scholars have found that contingent 
effects of gender on networks seem to vary across settings. 
Brass (1985) found few differences between men and 
women on the effects of centrality on supervisory and 
non-supervisory ratings of inﬂ uence, and most of the differ-
ences suggested that women beneﬁ ted more than men from 
a central network position. In a large sample of urban workers 
in China, Lin (2001: 99–124) did not ﬁ nd evidence of different 
returns on social capital for women and men, although he did 
ﬁ nd that women had less access to social capital than 
men—a ﬁ nding that is consistent with Ibarra (1992). Women 
in our sample did receive slightly smaller bonuses, but the 
gap does not seem related to differences in the effect of 
network structure across sexes. 
 Third, we explored whether the effects of network closure on 
bonus vary with the seniority of the banker, which might shed 
light on the relative importance of the trust and control 
mechanisms in driving the observed effects of network 
closure on performance. Closure is expected to accelerate 
the emergence of trust between the parties to an exchange, 
but it also serves to enforce cooperative norms among group 
members. If the observed effects of network closure on 
Closure and Performance
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performance are driven fundamentally by accelerating the 
emergence of trust, they should diminish with the seniority 
of the banker. The longer a banker is around, the lower the 
uncertainty about his or her behavior. Colleagues know (or 
they think they know) whether or not they should trust the 
banker. Third-party gossip may amplify this certainty (Burt and 
Knez, 1995) and convey it to newcomers, but the marginal 
effect of third-party gossip on the banker’s trustworthiness 
should decrease with the banker’s seniority. If, on the con-
trary, the effects of network closure on bonus are mostly due 
to normative control, senior bankers with dense networks 
should perform better than those with sparse networks. Our 
results showed that, holding rank constant, seniority had a 
signiﬁ cant negative effect on bonuses. It also has a negative 
effect on the mean evaluation received by bankers ( β = –.150; 
 p < .01). These elements suggest that bankers who remain 
with the bank but do not move up the ranks are likely to 
develop a reputation for being poor performers, which should 
make it harder for them to secure the collaboration of col-
leagues. These bankers, however, should do comparatively 
better if they are part of a cohesive group whose members 
experience normative pressures to help one another. 
 We ﬁ nd some evidence in our data suggesting that the 
effects of network closure on bonuses may operate more 
through enhanced normative control and less through acceler-
ating the emergence of trust between unfamiliar colleagues. 
Holding the variables included in the full models constant, the 
interaction between network density and seniority has a 
signiﬁ cant positive effect on bonus, attenuating the negative 
effect of seniority both in the acquirer ( β = .031,  p < .05) and 
in the provider role ( β = .057,  p < .01). The fact that the 
attenuation occurs also in the provider role is particularly 
interesting, because it suggests that bankers who have failed 
to keep pace may actually be better off providing information 
to a closely knit group of colleagues than trying to beneﬁ t 
from the independence conferred by a sparser provider 
network. These bankers should lose some freedom when 
doing their jobs, but the negative effects of such loss on their 
performance maybe more apparent than real in their case, 
whereas the beneﬁ ts of working with people who feel 
compelled to enlist their help are not. 
 Finally, we checked for possible biases caused by the fact 
that 176 people in our sample failed to complete the cross-
evaluation exercise and hence did not have a value for density 
in the acquirer role. Although 47 of these bankers left during 
the year and consequently were not eligible for bonuses, the 
remaining 129 did receive bonuses that were on average 
.163 standard deviations below the mean. If the decision to 
ignore the rating exercise was correlated with the residuals 
of bonuses, estimates for compensation may suffer from 
sample selection bias. To correct for this possibility, we used 
the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. We estimated the 
probability that an individual would not have completed the 
rating exercise as a function of background variables (gender, 
age, seniority, rank, and organizational unit) and calculated the 
inverse Mills ratio from the selection equation, which was 
subsequently included in our models. The inverse Mills ratio, 
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however, was not signiﬁ cant in any of the models ( p > .60), 
and the coefﬁ cients remained unchanged. Thus we report 
models without the correction for sample selection bias. 
 DISCUSSION 
 A consistent claim in sociological research is that actors 
embedded in a dense network of relationships are in a better 
position to exert control on each other’s behavior. Whether 
this control is beneﬁ cial or harmful to actors, however, has 
been the subject of an important debate. We contribute to 
this debate by arguing that the control effects of network 
closure on the performance of an actor depend on the 
predominant role the actor plays in the relationships. Control 
may beneﬁ t people when they need to induce others to 
behave according to their preferences, but it may hurt them 
when it forces them to behave according to the preferences 
of others. Asymmetric knowledge exchanges, in which ego 
plays either an acquirer or a provider role towards alter, 
present an ideal setting in which to test these contrasting 
effects of network closure on individual performance. Our 
analysis of the knowledge exchange network and individual 
performance in an investment bank shows that network 
closure in bankers’ acquirer role increases their bonus, but 
closure in their provider’s role decreases it. Furthermore, and 
consistent with the normative control mechanism associated 
with closure, the magnitude of these effects varies systemati-
cally with the banker’s formal rank: the positive effect of 
network closure in the acquirer role diminishes with rank, 
whereas the negative effect of closure in the provider role 
increases with rank. 
 Our results have theoretical and methodological conse-
quences for research on the relationship between network 
structures and outcomes. Theoretically, they highlight the 
importance of paying attention to the control effects of 
network structures on individual outcomes, as well as to the 
different roles actors can play in relationships. Control effects 
are central to Coleman’s (1988, 1990) theory of social capital 
and one of the two crucial mechanisms behind structural 
holes theory (Burt, 1992), which argues that actors bridging 
structural holes are better placed to pursue their own agendas 
by playing off disconnected contacts against one another. 
More recently, however, the theoretical debate has focused 
on the tension between the information beneﬁ ts of structural 
holes (or brokerage) and the trust beneﬁ ts of network closure 
(Burt, 2005). Dense networks are deemed beneﬁ cial in 
contexts in which lack of trust between willing parties can 
prevent a mutually beneﬁ cial exchange (Ahuja, 2000; Rowley, 
Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000; Burt, 2005). 
 Network closure, however, not only enhances trust, it also 
enhances mutual control. This distinction is theoretically 
important. Though trust is likely to beneﬁ t both parties to an 
exchange, mutual control may not. Our results suggest that, 
in asymmetric exchanges, closure may compel providers to 
put more time and energy into the exchange than they might 
have preferred. This is likely to beneﬁ t the acquirer, but it may 
also hurt the provider. The provider may still derive future 
beneﬁ ts from helping the acquirer, either directly from this 
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acquirer or from common third parties. Yet potential future 
beneﬁ ts do not eliminate present constraints. Moreover, 
because such constraints have noticeable negative conse-
quences for the provider’s current performance, the future 
beneﬁ ts that may result from helping colleagues in a dense 
network may be offset by a reputation for poor performance 
in the larger network. Viewed in light of the efforts invest-
ment banks make to encourage cooperation among emplo-
yees, our results point out a paradox: ﬁ rms encourage 
extensive cooperation across employees, but rewards go 
more to employees who are free to decide which colleagues 
they will help and which ones they won’t. The paradox, 
however, reﬂ ects an unavoidable tension in knowledge-intensive 
organizations. Management simply cannot have the informa-
tion to dictate whose needs should be given priority. The 
decision is left to the people who are in direct contact with 
the business. Firms can set up reporting structures and tweak 
reward systems, as well as create opportunities for people to 
build effective networks, but the initiative rests ultimately 
with their employees. 
 From a methodological standpoint, the results of our study 
suggest the importance of considering potential asymmetry in 
the interdependence between parties to advance our under-
standing of how network structures affect individual out-
comes. Asymmetric interdependence may exist even in 
exchanges that are deemed beneﬁ cial to both parties, such 
as interorganizational alliances, because mutual interest in 
the exchange does not erase preexisting power differences 
between the parties (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). These 
power differences can affect the relative beneﬁ t each party 
can derive from the alliance (Gulati and Wang, 2003) as 
well as the effect that the network structure in which the 
exchange is embedded has on the gains of each party 
(Bae and Gargiulo, 2004). 
 Our results also allow for a better understanding of the 
mechanisms behind the contingent effects of social capital. In 
his paper on contingency effects, Burt (1997: 352) found that 
ego networks rich in structural holes are more valuable to 
managers who are “the authors of their jobs,” because these 
managers can beneﬁ t more from access to diverse informa-
tion and freedom from others’ control. Our results are consis-
tent with these ﬁ ndings, but they also add an important 
caveat that clariﬁ es the nature of the control effects of dense 
networks. Like Burt, we found that the beneﬁ ts of structural 
holes increase to the extent that bankers occupy positions 
that beneﬁ t from being free from constraints when doing their 
jobs. 2 This result, however, is limited to the set of relation-
ships in which ego acts as a provider to his or her alters. In 
relationships in which ego needs to acquire information from 
alters, we found a signiﬁ cant positive effect of network 
closure in the acquirer role, which is largely driven by the 
beneﬁ ts of dense networks accruing to bankers who cannot 
rely on rank to induce their colleagues’ cooperation. The social 
capital of their ego networks is therefore consequential for all 
bankers, including those at the lowest rank, but this only 
becomes apparent once we isolate the role relationships 
affected by such a structure. 
2
Burt (1997) used number of peers to 
deﬁ ne the contingency function: the 
fewer the peers, the less codiﬁ ed the job, 
and the more freedom managers have to 
deﬁ ne how to do their work. We used 
rank to contrast the effects for the 
provider role with those of the acquirer 
role, but similar results were obtained 
using the number of peers in the rank for 
the provider role.
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 The positive effect of network closure in the acquirer network 
reported in this paper seems to differ from the ﬁ ndings in 
Podolny and Baron (1997), who reported that closure in the 
strategic information network was negatively related to 
promotion. The difference, however, is less substantial than it 
might seem. The acquirer network of our bankers includes 
all the people the banker depended on for knowledge and 
information in a signiﬁ cant manner, irrespective of their 
responsiveness to his or her needs. In contrast, the question 
Podolny and Baron (1997: 682) used elicited responses on 
“people who have given [ego] special insight into the goals 
and strategies of important individuals, divisions, or perhaps 
even the ﬁ rm as a whole” (Podolny and Baron 1997: 682). We 
argued that bankers varied in their ability to induce colleagues 
to help them and that this variance was partly explained by 
the closure of the network. By eliciting only names of people 
who effectively helped ego, the name generator used by 
Podolny and Baron (1997) circumvents the problem of the 
provider’s motivation to help the acquirer that is crucial to 
our argument. Ties between willing sources of information 
increase the redundancy of that information, whereas the 
marginal effect of those ties in inducing the sources to help 
ego is likely to be negligible. 
 Our results are consistent with ﬁ ndings reported by Lazega 
(2001) in his in-depth ﬁ eld study of partners in a law ﬁ rm, 
which highlighted the role of network closure in inducing 
cooperation and effective exchange. Speciﬁ cally, Lazega 
stressed the dual role of “social niches” (which correspond 
to groups of lawyers with high network closure and strong, 
multiplex ties) as mechanisms of social control and as 
sources of beneﬁ ts for individuals. Niches play a crucial role in 
making partners work, but they also provide its members with 
“resources at a low cost, a sense of identity and of common 
long-term interests, and the stimulation that is needed to 
work productively together” (Lazega, 2001: 27). The control-
ling properties of social structure emphasized in this paper 
are also apparent in what Lazega (2001: 201–241) described 
as a “lateral control regime” through which appropriate third 
parties are mobilized to put pressure on partners that neglect 
their commitments. 
 The positive effect of network closure is also consistent 
with Seibert, Kraimer, and Liden (2001), who found that 
weak ties were negatively related to access to information 
and that structural holes did not have any direct effect 
on such access. These ﬁ ndings remind us that securing 
access to information is not a trivial problem and that weak 
ties or sparse networks may not sufﬁ ce when such access 
requires the active cooperation of the provider. Rather, 
strong ties and network closure may be often necessary 
to induce the cooperation of the provider, even though 
it may force ego to incur redundancy costs. In a similar 
vein, Tortoriello and Krackhardt (2009) showed that the 
advantages traditionally associated with bridging ties 
depend on these ties being also embedded in common third 
parties—what Krackhardt (1998) dubbed “Simmelian ties”—
which increase the willingness to transfer knowledge across 
boundaries. 
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 The positive effect of acquirer network closure is also consis-
tent with Xiao and Tsui (2007), who reported that lack of 
structural holes increases salary and bonuses in a Chinese 
sample, albeit not with the negative effect of provider net-
work density. Though our sample did not include bankers 
located in mainland China, we tested whether the negative 
effect of provider network density was absent or attenuated 
for bankers located in Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea 
(N = 156) but did not ﬁ nd support for this possibility. This 
may simply reﬂ ect the fact that, as Xiao and Tsui (2007: 25) 
acknowledged, investment banks are typically “low commit-
ment” organizations in which the autonomy conferred by 
networks rich in structural holes is valuable. Beyond this 
difference, it is interesting to note that the positive effect of 
closure in their Chinese sample did not hold for job satisfac-
tion. This is somewhat surprising. If people were culturally 
predisposed to enjoy the beneﬁ ts of a closely knit network 
(which also brought them tangible economic beneﬁ ts), 
network closure should have had a strong positive effect 
on job satisfaction. If people resented the lack of autonomy 
associated with closed networks, however, the positive effect 
that network closure should have on job satisfaction through 
economic beneﬁ ts could be offset by the negative effects 
through reduced autonomy, resulting in the observed lack of 
association between network structure and job satisfaction. 
This pattern would be consistent with ﬁ ndings in other high-
commitment organizations (e.g., Kunda, 1992; Barker, 1993). 
 Our study is based on a large sample of investment bankers 
in different ranks working in 31 different countries in the 
Asia-Paciﬁ c area, Europe, and the Americas. The 93-percent 
response rate is substantially higher than that which is usually 
obtained with standard data collection techniques in network 
studies. Despite these positive attributes, however, our data 
have some limitations that should be taken into account. First, 
our dataset lacks an adequate measure of tie strength. This is 
important because existing research suggests that alters who 
feel close to ego might have made additional efforts to help 
ego (Hansen 1999, 2002; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). One 
might be tempted to use the value of the evaluations as a 
measure of tie strength, but the pattern of evaluations in our 
data does not justify such an approach. If evaluations had 
corresponded to the strength of the tie between ego and 
alter, evaluations of same-rank colleagues would have been 
signiﬁ cantly higher than evaluations of higher-rank colleagues, 
because strong ties between people in different ranks are on 
average less common than between peers. Yet the opposite 
is true in our dataset. On average, bankers evaluated 
colleagues in higher ranks better than those in their same 
rank (2.71 vs. 2.66;  p < .001) and same-rank colleagues better 
than lower-rank ones (2.66 vs. 2.59;  p < .001). Evaluations 
therefore do not seem to be a good indicator of the close-
ness between ego and alter, which scholars view as the 
best single indicator of tie strength (Marsden and Campbell, 
1984). 
 The limitation of not having an adequate control for tie 
strength may not be very serious in our sample, however, 
because it is unlikely that successful bankers would have 
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relied mostly on strong ties to secure the cooperation of their 
colleagues. Such ties take time to develop and thus may not 
be in place when the need for the exchange emerges, 
especially in the changing environment of investment bank-
ing. Relying predominantly on strong ties may cut bankers off 
from important sources of information and support to do their 
ongoing jobs, with a consequent negative effect on their 
performance. Our results offer some support for this conjec-
ture. If we assume that strong ties are more likely to develop 
in reciprocal exchanges (Marsden and Campbell, 1984), the 
strong negative effect of reciprocation on performance 
reported in our models suggests that successful bankers 
might have not relied predominantly on strong ties. 
 Second, the constraint imposed by the grid of cross-evaluations 
between business units may result in the omission of some 
alters from a banker’s ego network. If the alter works for a 
business unit that does not appear in ego’s roster, ego could 
not evaluate him or her. Yet the grid was deﬁ ned by senior 
managers based on their detailed knowledge of the inter-
dependencies between business units in the ﬁ rm. This 
suggests that people who were not able to rate each other 
would have been unlikely to have had “signiﬁ cant business 
interactions” (the criteria for selecting alters) with one 
another. However unlikely, the restriction imposed by man-
agement might have still resulted in some omitted ties in our 
network data. More importantly, if omissions were present, 
they may not be random: bankers in less connected units 
should have been more likely to have missing ties, because 
the number of colleagues excluded from their rosters was 
higher. Heterogeneity across the bankers’ rosters might have 
caused biased measures of network size and density. Yet we 
did attempt to control for this possibility by including business 
unit ﬁ xed effects. Because the roster of colleagues bankers 
could evaluate—and, by implication, those they could not 
evaluate—depends entirely on a banker’s unit, including unit 
ﬁ xed effects in the model should control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the bankers’ networks resulting from the 
interunit evaluation grid imposed by management. 
 The third limitation pertains to the generalizability of our 
results. Although investment bankers are the quintessential 
example of knowledge workers, the fast-paced nature of the 
business, the minimal formal structure, the competition 
among colleagues for sizeable rewards, and the signiﬁ cant 
levels of turnover create working conditions that are not 
necessarily common to all knowledge workers. While work 
in more traditional ﬁ rms is changing (Sutton and Hagardon, 
1996; Hansen, Podolny, and Pfeffer, 2001), investment banks 
still present some idiosyncrasies that require caution when 
generalizing our results. 
 Like other mechanisms associated with social structures, the 
normative control of network closure has two faces: it can 
help actors to secure the cooperation of people whose inputs 
are crucial to achieve their goals, but it can also curtail their 
freedom in choosing with whom to cooperate. Whether 
network closure is ultimately a net cost or a net beneﬁ t to an 
actor depends on the role this actor plays in the relationship 
affected by that closure. By focusing on these roles and on 
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the particular conditions of the exchanges within each role, 
our paper stresses the importance of the control mechanisms 
associated with social structures on individual outcomes. 
Network closure beneﬁ ts the dependent party and hurts 
the powerful one. Trust may sufﬁ ce to enable exchanges 
between willing players, but the control mechanisms of 
network closure may be necessary to induce the cooperation 
of more reluctant but essential parties. 
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